●本書の特徴
本書は，著者が長年にわたり展開してきた信念変化の理論とそれに基づく知識概念の分析についての理論を，近年，英米で注目を集めるようになった実験哲学の文脈の中で経験的に探究し，著者の分析的研究から導き出された知識の分析に対する経験的証拠を与えるものである。
本書の前半は，2004年の科学基礎論学会で学会賞を受賞した“A Simple Nonmonotonic Logic as a Model of Belief Change”を再構築したものである。そこにおける分析によれば，知識とは現実の情報に対し単調な信念で
●目次
Preface
Introduction
Part I Analysis of Knowledge
Chapter 1 An Analysis from the Most Abstract Principles
1.1 Argument from Accumulation Principle
1.2 Argument from the Omni-Believer
1.3 From OB Principle to Sufficient Condition
1.4 Belief Change and Analysis of Knowledge
1.5 Knowledge as Doxastic and Epistemic Necessity
1.6 Analysis Based on the Normal Pattern of Belief Change
Chapter 2 Infallibility and Monotonicity
2.1 Knowledge and Infallibility
2.2 Reformulation of Hintikka's System
2.3 The KK-Thesis
Chapter 3 Knowledge as Monotonic Belief
3.1 Analysis of Knowledge as Monotonic Belief
3.2 Sufficient Condition
3.3 Intuition about Belief Change
3.4 Accommodating the Theory of Belief Change
3.5 MB and the RA Theory
3.6 Answering Sceptical Challenges
3.7 Disjunction Argument
Chapter 4 Epistemology Based on NPBC
4.1 Rationality and Normativity
4.2 Belief Change Fundamentalism
4.3 Psychologism and NPBC
4.4 Justification vs. NPBC
4.5 Internal and External Justification
Chapter 5 Sustainability as a Synthesized View of Knowledge
5.1 Human Knowledge and Animal Knowledge
5.2 Empirical and Non-Empirical Knowledge
5.3 Other Similar Analyses
5.4 Differences from Analyses of Rott and Stalnaker
Part II Belief Change
Chapter 6 Belief in Belief Change
6.1 Belief and World-Picture
6.2 Kinds of Beliefs
6.3 BK-Belief as a Component of World-Picture
Chapter 7 On the Very Idea of Belief Change
7.1 AGM
7.2 Some Assumptions of AGM
7.3 Logic, Reasoning, and Belief Change
7.4 Symbolic and Sub-Symbolic Level
7.5 Foundations Theory and Coherence Theory
Chapter 8 Fact and Information
8.1 Confinement Imagery and Direct Realism
8.2 KB-Belief and Information
8.3 Information, Proposition, and Meaning
8.4 Information and the Veridicality Thesis
Chapter 9 Derivation Rules and Information Processor
9.1 Some Requirements for the Theory of Information Processing
9.2 Basic Assumptions
9.3 Derivation Rules as the Theory of Information Processing
9.4 Logical Omniscience and the New Consistency
9.5 Possible Extension
Chapter 10 A Simple Nonmonotonic Logic as a Model of Belief Change
10.1 Nonmonotonic Reasoning
10.2 Formal Analysis
10.3 Metaphysical Considerations
10.4 Demonstration: Execution Examples
10.5 Comparison and Advantages
Part III Experimental Philosophy and Developmental Approach
Chapter 11 Experimental Philosophy and Developmental Approach
11.1 Experimental Philosophy
11.2 The Limit of Experimental Philosophy?
11.3 Cultural Diversity
11.4 Developmental Approach as Conceptual Reverse Engineering
Chapter 12 Epistemology Meets Philosophy of Mind
12.1 Theory of Mind
12.2 From False Belief Task to Gettier Task
12.3 Gettier Task and Belief-Change Task
12.4 Some Initial Worries about This Project
12.5 From Animal Self to Social Self
12.6 From Egocentric World to Seamless World
12.7 Epistemology and Psychology combined through Philosophy of Mind
Chapter 13 Gettier Task and Belief Change Task
13.1 Two Approaches to the Experiment
13.2 False-Belief Task and Belief Change Task
13.3 The Mystery of Indirect Knowledge and Testimony Task
13.4 Why Do More Children Answer \\Yes\\ as They Become Older?
Chapter 14 Chocolate Task as the Second Gettier Task
14.1 Chocolate Task
14.2 Objections
14.3 Conclusion
Appendix Data of Chapter 13 and 14
Bibliography
Index
